Of course, any attempts to specify the effects of media freedom will raise econometric difficulties. The patterns presented in this paper hold true even after controlling for a number of factors, including income, age, education, and democracy/autocracy, but doubtless other factors could be proposed. Moreover, media freedom is not an exogenous factor randomly distributed across countries. Instead, media freedom reflects underlying social, legal, political, economic, and even cultural factors, and in turn also helps to shape those factors. Much work remains to be done in sorting out these issues of causality, perhaps by figuring out appropriate instrumental variables. The empirical patterns presented in this paper should therefore be interpreted with appropriate caution.
The findings in this paper complement other recent research by economists on the effects of media freedom. For example, Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova, and Shleifer (2003) find that private media ownership is associated with improved social outcomes; in contrast, where the media is state owned, citizens lead poorer, unhealthier, and shorter lives. The findings in my paper suggest a specific channel connecting media freedom and economic development. In countries where government interferes with the media, individuals know less about basic political issues and are less politically involved. Politically ignorant and apathetic individuals do not know enough about political happenings or participate enough politically to monitor or punish effectively the activities of selfinterested politicians. When politicians are free from accountability to voters, they are more likely to pursue privately beneficial policies, which in turn lead to lower development.
Although this paper is the first to examine the relationship between media freedom and political knowledge, participation, and voter turnout, other recent research has considered some of these linkages from other angles. One body of research has discussed the role of media-provided information in informing the electorate (Coyne and Leeson, 2004; Stromberg, 2004; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Besley and Prat, 2006; Mueller 1992; Sen, 1984 Sen, , 1999 . For instance, Snyder and Stromberg (2004) find that where voters are better politically informed as a result of more media coverage, politicians are more responsive to their wants. Again, de Tocqueville (1835-1840, p. 518) seems to have anticipated the issues here when he wrote: "A newspaper is not only able to suggest a common plan to many men; it provides them with the means of carrying out in common the plans that they have thought of for themselves." Another strand of work considers the relationship between television and voting. Gentzkow (2006), for example, provides an especially interesting examination of television consumption's impact on voter turnout. Similarly, Althaus and Trautman (2004) investigate the impact of television market size on voter turnout. Other research examines the relationship between press freedom and corruption. For instance, Ahrend (2002) and Brunetti and Weder (2003) find that higher press freedom is associated with lower corruption.
Media Freedom and Political Knowledge
The recent transition experience of the postsocialist world provides an excellent ground to examine the connection between media freedom and political knowledge. Since 1991, the countries of central and eastern Europe have moved in different directions with respect to government's relationship to the media. Some, such as Poland, have liberalized substantial portions of their economies, including the media, which used to be in the state's hands. Others, such as Romania, have liberalized comparatively little. In these places the media remains largely under government control. These divergent paths have created interesting variation for investigating the relationship between media freedom and citizens' political knowledge.
The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2004) survey provides important information about the political knowledge of central and eastern Europeans. In October and November 2003, this survey quizzed more than 12,000 citizens on nine basic political facts of the European Union (EU) in the following EUcandidate countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. EU-candidate countries are nations seeking membership in the European Union that, upon the European Commission's recommendation, advance to official candidacy.
The complete list of true-or-false questions administered in these countries is as follows (correct answer in parentheses): 1) The EU is made of 15 states (True);
2) The European Community was created after World War I (False); 3) The European flag is bright blue with yellow stars (True); 4) There are 15 stars on the European flag (False); 5) Headquarters of the EU are in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg (True); 6) Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the EU (True); 7) There is a President of the EU directly elected by all the citizens (False); 8) The EU has its own anthem (True); 9) There are no borders between the EU (True).
Possible membership in the European Union is important for these countries. Thus, if media freedom is connected to citizens' political knowledge, questions about the European Union are a good place to look. In addition, although pan-European issues are somewhat different from purely local ones, they play a significant role in shaping policies at the local level, too. Measuring citizens' knowledge about basic political facts of the European Union in EU-candidate countries therefore measures an important part of their political knowledge and likely proxies for knowledge about more purely local political issues that cannot be directly measured through the Eurobarometer quiz. In addition, a significant advantage of European Union questions is that the correct answers are identical for all respondents, regardless of country. To investigate this relationship further, I use ordinary least squares regressions. My dependent variable is individuals' scores on the nine-question EU political quiz. Since the quiz contains nine questions, scores range from zero (no questions answered correctly) to nine (all questions answered correctly). All questions have a true-or-false format. Only citizens age 15 and older took the political quiz. Respondents who answered "Don't know" to a question were scored as having answered this question incorrectly. Those who refused to answer a question were dropped from the dataset, creating a total of 12,006 observations. The sample size for each country is roughly equal (about 1,000) with the exception of Malta and Cyprus, which have 500 each. My key independent variable is Freedom House's (2004) media freedom score for each country in 2003. Freedom House assigns points to countries on the basis of three, equally-weighted categories related to media's independence from government. Together, these categories create a composite score of media freedom, which I have rescaled to range from zero (completely unfree) to one (completely free). The three categories this index includes are: 1) legal environment, which looks at laws, statues, constitutional provisions, and regulations that enable or restrict the media's ability to operate freely in a country; 2) political environment, which evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media in each country (such as editorial independence, official or unofficial censorship, harassment or attacks against journalists); and 3) economic environment, which includes the structure of media ownership, media-related infrastructure, its concentration, the impact of corruption or bribery on news media content, and the selective withholding or bestowal of subsidies or other sources of financial revenue on some media outlets by the state. The media this index considers include TV, radio, newspaper, and the Internet.
Romania provides a good example of how government can use these channels to suppress media freedom. For instance, many Romanian media outlets owe back taxes to the government, putting them under pressure to bias their coverage if they wish to remain in business. Other outlets rely predominantly on the state for advertising revenue to stay afloat. The Romanian government also regulates the media through licensure and has historically controlled important media-related inputs, such as distribution networks for newspapers.
To account for individual characteristics that might affect quiz scores, I include a number of control variables. The first three control variables in my regression are respondents' income, age, and education level. Data for these variables are from the Eurobarometer (2004) survey. To control for the impact of a country's average income on individual quiz scores, I also include each country's gross national income per capita in 2000, using data from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004) .
Finally, I want to control for institutional factors that may contribute to how an individual performs on the political quiz, such as the how democratic/authoritarian the government is in each country and the quantity of resources that each government devotes to education for its citizens. For this purpose, I use data on the extent of democracy/autocracy in each country for 2000 from the Polity IV Project (2003). The "Polity" variable ranges from -10, or complete autocracy, to ϩ10, or complete democracy, and measures the presence or absence of political institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders.
I also include data on countries' public expenditures on education as a percentage of gross domestic product from the World Development Indicators Table 1 presents the results of this analysis. I find a large, positive, and highly significant association between media freedom and political knowledge. Where the media is less free, citizens are less politically knowledgeable. Column 1 presents the unadjusted correlation from Figure 1 . Falling from the highest level of media freedom in the sample to the lowest is associated with a 42 percent increase in political ignorance. Stated differently, moving from the freest media in the sample to the least free is associated with a 0.96 standard deviation fall in political knowledge.
This relationship is similar when I include controls in column 2 of Table 1 . After controlling for respondent income, age, and education, how democratic/ authoritarian each government is (the "Polity" variable), average income in each country, and how much each government spends on public education, falling from the country with the freest media in the sample to the country with the least free media is associated with a 37 percent increase in political ignorance. This represents a 0.83 standard deviation decline in political knowledge. In different terms, going from the highest level of media freedom in the sample to the lowest means dropping from a quiz score average of (4.56/9 Ϸ) 51 percent correct to a quiz score average of (2.86/9 Ϸ) 32 percent correct. 3 The other significant variables in column 2 have the expected signs. For example, higher individual income and more education are associated with higher quiz scores. Younger quiz takers also score significantly better. This pattern may arise because they have a greater interest in EU-related issues, since EU membership might affect their futures more strongly than those of older quiz takers. The coefficient on "Public expenditures on education" is negative, but small and insignificant, as is that for "gross national income per capita." Alone, the variables "Public expenditures on education" and "GNI per capita" are found to be positively related to quiz score. However, they seem to be capturing part of the effect of the media freedom; including the variable "Media freedom" together with "Public expenditures on education" and "GNI per capita" makes the latter two variables insignificant.
While these results point to an important relationship between media freedom and political knowledge, it is important to exercise caution when interpreting them. They rely only on a single-cross section and may not capture a number of important variables that might also contribute to individuals' quiz performance; and without instrumental variables, they cannot establish causality. Nevertheless, the strong relationship found here suggests that media freedom is likely an important factor influencing citizens' political knowledge.
Media Freedom and Political Participation
I search for additional support for the channel connecting media freedom and citizens' political knowledge by exploring the relationship between media freedom and . This pattern makes intuitive sense. Where political knowledge is low-for instance, because of low media freedom-the value of political participation is also low. With inadequate political knowledge, citizens cannot effectively monitor and punish self-serving politicians. In such an environment, political participation is mostly cost with little benefit. The result should be low political activeness. If low media freedom is meaningfully associated with political ignorance, it should therefore also be associated with political apathy. To see if this pattern holds, I look at four measures of political participation: an individual's stated willingness to sign petitions, to attend lawful demonstrations, to join unofficial strikes, and to occupy buildings in protest (or the individual's stated history of having done these things). These data are from the World Values Survey (2005), which questioned nearly 90,000 respondents age 18 and over from 65 countries about their level of political involvement between 1999 and 2002. I eliminate countries for which there is no measure of media freedom, yielding a sample of more than 80,000 respondents from 61 countries. 4 Figures 2a-d depict the raw relationship between media freedom and political participation in each country using individuals' average willingness to engage in each of the political activities indicated above. For all measures of political participation, the relationship is clearly positive. A freer media is associated with a substantially greater willingness to sign petitions, attend lawful demonstrations, join unofficial strikes, and occupy buildings in protest. 5 To further investigate the relationship between media freedom and political participation along these dimensions, I consider several ordinary least squares regressions. My dependent variable is individuals' willingness to participate in one of the four political activities described above. This variable is an index I have rescaled to range from zero to one. Zero means a respondent "would never do" the political activity in question; 0.5 means the respondent "might do" the activity; 1 means the respondent "has done" the political activity. Table 2 presents the results for political participation. I find a consistently sizeable, positive, and highly significant relationship between media freedom and these measures of political activeness. After controlling for the factors discussed above, these results become somewhat smaller and less significant. However, they remain sizeable, and in all cases but one, remain significant at the 10 percent level or better. Where the media is less free, citizens are less politically active.
Consider, for example, the relationship between media freedom and a citizen's willingness to sign petitions. After controlling for individual-level characteristics and country-level factors that might affect a citizen's willingness to sign petitions, moving from the country with the freest media in the sample to the one with the least media freedom is associated with a 54 percent fall in citizens' willingness to sign petitions (0.46 -0.21)/0.46). In other words, going from the freest media in the sample to the least free is associated with a 0.61 standard deviation drop in political activeness along this dimension. The other measures of political participation yield similar decreases in participation with decreases in media freedom. The other variables in Table 2 have the expected signs, though only education is significant across the board. Younger and more-educated citizens are more politically active. Higher individual income, gross national income per capita, and democracy ("Polity") are also associated with more political participation, though insignificantly.
Of course, like the results discussed above, these too are only suggestive. A government that suppresses the media may also suppress other forms of political liberty. Controlling for democracy/autocracy should help to address this, but the simple procedure used here cannot establish causality. Further, a government that suppresses the media may generate "displaced political activity," as citizens seek alternative ways of expressing themselves outside of those considered here. My regressions do not address these issues, so it is important to bear these limitations in mind when interpreting the results. Notes: Dependent variables are shown in the top row: "Sign petitions," "Attend lawful demonstrations," "Join unofficial strikes," and "Occupy buildings." "Polity" is an index of democracy/autocracy with higher scores indicating greater openness. Regressions are ordinary least squares (intercepts not reported). Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. For detailed variable descriptions see online Appendix 2 at ͗http://www.e-jep.org͘. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Media Freedom and Voter Turnout
Since voting is another component of political activeness along with those discussed in the previous section (though arguably more important), if lower media freedom is associated with reduced political knowledge, we should also expect to observe lower voter turnout where the media is less free. Politically ignorant individuals know less about important political issues, find it more difficult to become interested or active in issues they know little or nothing about, and have less incentive to vote since they are less likely to effect change through voting in the first place. The relationship between media freedom and political knowledge or political participation should therefore parallel the relationship between media freedom and voter turnout. If low media freedom is meaningfully associated with political ignorance and low political participation, we should find lower voter turnout where the media is less free and vice versa.
To investigate this pattern, I use the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's (IIDEA) data on voter turnout across countries. These data measure voter turnout as the number of votes cast in each country's most recent parliamentary election for which data are available (usually 2000), divided by the population of voting age. I look at the same countries surveyed by the World Values Survey on political participation and drop observations for which there are no media freedom data, yielding a sample of 59 countries. (2000) dataset, "International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications," respectively. Finally, it is important to control for whether or not a country has an active compulsory voting law, which I do with data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Compulsory voting laws require citizens to vote in national elections. These laws and their enforcement vary across countries. For example, in some countries, citizens are required to vote only if they register, but registration is not mandatory and the punishment for not voting is only a nominal fine. In other nations the law is taken much more seriously. In Peru, for instance, voters must carry a card for two months following an election to prove they have voted and may be denied access to public services if they do not. Table 3 presents the results of these regressions. The relationship between media freedom and voter turnout is consistent with my findings for the relationship between media freedom, political knowledge, and participation. It is large, positive, and highly significant, even after controlling for income, education, and compulsory voting laws. Where the media is less free, citizens vote less. After accounting for these other factors, moving from the country with the freest media in the sample to the one with the least media freedom is associated with falling from approximately 77 percent voter turnout to approximately 38 percent voter turnout. Stated differently, within the sample, going from the country with the most free media to the least free is associated with a 2.41 standard deviation reduction in voter turnout.
Here, none of the coefficients on the control variables are significant, including compulsory voting, which is positive but insignificant. In column 3, when I re-estimate the relationship between media freedom and voter turnout excluding countries with compulsory voting laws, the results are essentially unchanged. This finding suggests that many compulsory voting laws are weak or poorly enforced. Education's coefficient is negative but insignificant, both with and without countries with compulsory voting laws. It is uncertain what accounts for this, though it is possible that more-educated citizens have a higher opportunity cost of voting and so vote less.
Again, it is important to keep in mind that this simple empirical strategy cannot establish causality and does not account for unobserved factors that may be influencing my results. Nevertheless, a casual look at the countries in my sample with the most and least media freedom, and their corresponding rates of voter 
Conclusion
The evidence in this paper shows that low media freedom is strongly associated with poor political knowledge, low political participation, and low voter turnout. The reverse is true for countries with higher media freedom. The results have been presented here in their most straightforward and unvarnished form. However, they are robust to sample, specification, and alternative measures of media freedom, as shown in regression tables appearing in an on-line Appendix to this paper (Appendix 1) available with the paper at ͗http://www.e-jep.org͘.
For instance, for the regressions that consider political knowledge, I also try controlling for whether or not individuals have ever heard of the European Union, the EU parliament, and how much attention they pay to EU-related news. Additionally, I include controls for how much television, newspaper, and radio individ- uals consume. However, more media freedom remains significantly associated with higher political knowledge and vice versa. I also use alternative measures of citizens' political knowledge. For example, I try using whether or not respondents have heard of the European Union or the EU parliament as dependent variables and find a similar pattern. Using how much media-provided news citizens consume as a dependent variable also supports my findings. With the exception of television, where the media is less free and therefore media-provided information has lower value to citizens, they consume less of it.
I apply a similar sensitivity analysis to the regressions that look at political participation and voter turnout. For instance, I try controlling for the extent to which citizens follow politics in the news. I also check to see if some particular region of the world is driving my results. In both cases, the pattern is similar. Where the media is freer, citizens participate politically and vote more. Where the media is less free, the reverse is true. As always, it would be preferable to have data for additional time periods and countries. Since my analysis relies on only a single cross-section, it would be overhasty to interpret its results as definitively causal. Still, the consistency and robustness of the findings across political knowledge, participation, and voter turnout suggests that these results are telling us a story that is likely to hold true, even if the magnitudes of my coefficients will likely be revisited in future research. Specifically, where the state controls the media, citizens tend to be politically ignorant and apathetic. In turn, politically ignorant and apathetic citizens are not politically knowledgeable or active enough to effectively monitor or punish the activities of self-interested politicians. 
Appendix 1 Sensitivity Analysis
This appendix performs sensitivity analyses for the regressions in Tables 1-3.  Table A1 .1 considers the relationship between media freedom and political knowledge, this time adding additional controls for 1) whether or not the respondent has ever heard of the EU, 2) whether or not the respondent has ever heard of the European parliament, 3) how much television, radio, and daily paper news the respondent consumes; and 4) how much attention the respondent says he or she pays to EU-related news. Table A1 .2 uses whether or not an individual has ever heard of the EU and whether that person has ever heard of the European parliament as dependent variables.
In Table A1 .3, I examine the relationship between media freedom and the amount of media-provided news individuals consume from TV, radio, and daily newspapers, using both the Freedom House and Reporters Sans Frontieres media freedom measures. Table A1 .4 performs sensitivity analyses for the regressions relating to political participation. They include a variable that measures the extent to which an individual reports that he or she follows politics in the news.
In Table A1 .5, I check to see if my results for political participation and voter turnout are driven by a particular region, using regional dummies for North America, South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. Table A1 .6 reruns the main regressions from Tables 1-3 For "Quiz score," using "Journalist suppression"-income, GNI per capita, age, and education. For "Quiz score," using Reporters Sans Frontieres' measure of media freedom-income, GNI per capita, age, and education, "Polity," and public expenditure on education. For "Sign petitions," "Attend lawful demonstrations," "Join unofficial strikes," and "Occupy buildings": income, GNI per capita, age, education, and "Polity." For "Voter turnout": GNI per capita, years of education, and compulsory voting. For detailed variable descriptions, see Appendix 2. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Appendix 2

Descriptions of Variables
Attend lawful demonstrations
Index of respondent's willingness to attend lawful demonstrations, rescaled from 0 to 1 so that 0 ϭ "would never do," 0. 
Compulsory voting
A binary variable that is equal to 1 if a country had and enforced a law compelling its citizens to vote in the most recent parliamentary election and is equal to zero otherwise. Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2005).
Daily paper news consumption
Frequency with which respondent reads the news in daily papers, rescaled from 0 to 1 where 1 ϭ "every day," 0.75 ϭ "several times a week," 0. 
Follow politics in the news
Frequency with which respondent follows politics on television, the radio, or in daily papers rescaled from 0 to 1 where 1 ϭ "every day," 0.75 ϭ "several times a week," 0.5 ϭ "once or twice a week," and 0 ϭ "less often," 
Join unofficial strikes
Index of respondent's willingness to join unofficial strikes rescaled from 0 to 1 so that 0 ϭ "would never do," 0. 
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Occupy buildings
Index of respondent's willingness to occupy buildings or factories in protest rescaled from 0 to 1 so that 0 ϭ "would never do," 0. 
Public expenditure on education
Government expenditure on education, including subsidies to private education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, 
Radio news consumption
Frequency with which respondent listens to the news on the radio, rescaled from 0 to 1 where 1 ϭ "every day," 0.75 ϭ "several times a week," 0.5 ϭ "once or twice a week," and 0 ϭ "less often," 2003. Source: Eurobarometer (2004).
Sign petitions
Index of respondent's willingness to sign petitions rescaled from 0 to 1 so that 0 ϭ "would never do," 0. 
TV news consumption
Frequency with which respondent watches the news on television, rescaled from 0 to 1 where 1 ϭ "every day," 0.75 ϭ "several times a week," 0.5 ϭ "once or twice a week," and 0 ϭ "less often," 2003. Source: Eurobarometer (2004).
Voter turnout
The total number of votes in the most recent parliamentary election (usually 2000) divided by the population of voting age. Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2005).
